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BOOK REVIEWS
A COMING CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. OVER TAIWAN
Lewis, John Wilson, and Xue Litai. Imagined Enemies: China Prepares for Uncertain War. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. 377pp. $60
This sophisticated Chinese-language re-
search, based on numerous original
sources and interviews, completes
Lewis and Xue’s authoritative series on
China’s military development. Other
books in the series, all published by
Stanford University Press, are China’s
Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force
Modernization in the Nuclear Age (1994),
Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the
Korean War (1993), and China Builds
the Bomb (1988).
In this fourth and final volume, the au-
thors (both scholars affiliated with Stan-
ford) begin by surveying Chinese
military culture and history. Among
their findings is that as part of a larger
effort to exploit military tension with
Moscow to further his personal power,
in 1969 Marshal Lin Biao placed China’s
nuclear forces on “full alert” (an action
both unprecedented and, thus far,
unrepeated) without Mao Zedong’s ap-
proval or knowledge. Such assertions
should be weighed against other infor-
mation as it emerges. Lingering uncer-
tainties are hardly the fault of the
authors, however, because, as they point
out, “no [Chinese] Party, military, or
state contemporary security-related ar-
chives have been opened up to the general
citizenry, let alone foreign scholars.”
Part Two elucidates China’s military
decision making. A key finding is that
China’s national command authority
resides with the Politburo Standing
Committee even during “the most in-
tense crises involving armed threats and
military deployments” but that it trans-
fers to the Party’s Central Military
Commission in war. Untested in battle
since 1979 (against Vietnam), the dy-
namics of these complex bureaucracies
remain uncertain even after this pene-
trating analysis.
The third part examines China’s recent
efforts to modernize its strategic rocket
forces and air force. Efforts to improve
strategic missile command, mobility,
and survivability appear to have been
partially tested in the 1995–1996 cross-
Strait crisis and in subsequent exercises.
The authors’ earlier assertion that China’s
current doctrine of “‘active defense’ can
justify preemption even before the en-
emy has struck because the enemy in-
tended to strike first” raises troubling
questions about China’s stated policy of
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no first use of nuclear weapons (NFU).
Indeed, the authors demonstrate that,
alarmed at the prospect of a conven-
tional attack on its strategic infrastruc-
ture, China’s military planners have
recently revisited NFU. This, and lin-
gering problems with military aviation
(despite the catalyst of the 1991 Gulf
War, subsequent Russian imports, and
incremental domestic progress), have
caused Beijing to seek additional deter-
rence through a growing arsenal of con-
ventional missiles.
Finally, the authors assess the degree to
which China’s military has met the stra-
tegic imperatives of its ancient strate-
gists and modern leaders. They reach
the sobering conclusion that despite
China’s continuing difficulty in ap-
proaching Western technological and
even organizational levels, Taiwan’s im-
portance to Chinese identity, strategic
value, and position as a bellwether of
national territorial integrity justify ex-
traordinary expenditure of blood and
treasure. Moreover, China’s military
planners appear to believe that by in-
vesting selectively in asymmetric weap-
ons, they can reconcile these conflicting
realities without fueling an arms race
and hence mutual insecurity. It is to be
hoped that a new generation in Beijing,
Taipei, and Washington, drawing on
Lewis’s and Xue’s research, will find the
collective wisdom to avert conflict that
would devastate all parties involved.
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
Naval War College
Dreyer, Edward L. Zheng He: China and the
Oceans in the Early Ming Dynasty, 1405–1433. Old
Tappan, N.J.: Pearson Longman, 2006. 238pp.
$20.67
The military history of China has be-
come a common element in the profes-
sional reading of many American
military officers. Journals like this one
have included an important focus on the
Chinese past and present, and Edward
Dreyer’s book contributes important
new history and analysis to that under-
standing. Studying the Chinese foreign
expeditionary armada of the early fif-
teenth century, Dreyer outlines a Chi-
nese strategy and set of naval tactics
that are familiar to today’s naval officer.
Starting in 1405 the eunuch Admiral
Zheng He led a series of seven voyages
from the shores of the Ming empire
into the South China Sea and Indian
Ocean. These voyages were made by
fleets larger than any the world had ever
seen; armadas of over two hundred ves-
sels, the largest wooden vessels ever
constructed, carrying roughly thirty
thousand sailors and marine infantry.
Scholars and Chinese government his-
torians have characterized these expedi-
tions, which reached as far west as the
coast of Africa, as peaceful voyages of
discovery. Dreyer, however, disagrees.
He writes instead, “After thoroughly re-
viewing the primary Chinese sources, I
concluded that the purpose of the voy-
ages was actually ‘power projection’ . . .
rather than mere exploration. Zheng
He’s voyages were undertaken to force
the states of Southeast Asia and the In-
dian Ocean to acknowledge the power
and majesty of Ming China and its
emperor.”
The book is structured in a straightfor-
ward manner, chronologically moving
from Zheng He’s personal biography
and the background history of the voy-
ages to the voyages themselves. While
not a professional naval architect,
Dreyer has obviously done his research.
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